A healthy bilateral relationship between any two countries is essentially underscored by ‘mutual sensitivity’, a foundational value glaringly absent from the current India-Bangladesh ties. Sheikh Hasina had played an undeniable role in bringing Dhaka closer to Delhi. Since the fall of her government, Muhammad Yunus-led Bangladesh is redrawing the political map, one where Dhaka is growing closer to Islamabad and further from Delhi (Halder, Majumder, and Khokon 2025, 157). Besides allowing Islamists a free rein in the country and acquiescing to their sectarian and anti-India agenda, the Yunus administration has also effected a deep reset in Bangladesh’s foreign policy by forging very close links of especially military and strategic nature, with both Pakistan and Türkiye. The piece will try to address how and why India will be affected by a deepening military tie with Turkiye, what this means for the subcontinent, and how these changes could affect the region.
Very recently, the Nobel laureate and chief advisor to the Bangladeshi government, Professor Muhammad Yunus, allocated a record 55,000 crore taka to build infrastructure for the production of defence equipment in Bangladesh. A landmark defence deal with Türkiye is in its final stages, an agreement that will likely witness Dhaka acquire the SIPER long-range air defense system and potentially co-produce Turkish combat drones. Since 2010, Bangladesh has imported 15 different types of military equipment from Türkiye. This effectively earns Bangladesh the title of the fourth-largest market for Turkish military equipment. Interestingly, the Milli İstihbarat Teskilatı (MIT), which is Türkiye’s spy agency, financed the renovation of Jamaat-i-Islami’s office in Dhaka and organised visits by Jamaat and other Islamists, as well as select leaders of the July uprising, to Turkish Arms manufacturing units (Halder, Majumder, and Khokon 2025, 169). By inviting an influential NATO member with an independent streak, such as Türkiye, into its inner circle, Dhaka is enhancing its leverage with other partners, including China, Denmark, and the U.S. For India, watching from the sidelines, it is a relatively novel strategic headache with immediate security concerns.
On the other hand, during his brief tenure, Mohammad Yunus met Shehbaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister, twice in September and December 2024 to enhance bilateral ties. Accordingly, plans are in place to resume direct flights between the two countries, and Dhaka has lifted visa restrictions for Pakistani passengers. In response, Islamabad has waived visa fees for Bangladeshis. Two Pakistani cargo ships arrived at Chittagong port in November and December 2024, carrying nearly 1,000 containers of industrial materials, including soda ash, dolomite, and marble blocks, as well as garments, raw materials, sugar, and other products. This is the first time since 1973 that Pakistani ships have been allowed to enter Bangladeshi ports and dock without inspection (Sharma 2025, 63). Pakistan has moved swiftly to seize the opportunity and offered Dhaka the use of its Karachi port. The timing of the move is crucial as the events followed only weeks after India banned the import of jute products from Bangladesh.
Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met with Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus at the State Guest House Jamuna on Sunday, Aug 24, 2025, regarding the July Uprising painting. Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus underlined the revival of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as a “top priority” in his talks with the visiting Pakistan Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. On the first day of his three-day official visit to Bangladesh, the Pakistan Navy Chief Admiral Naveed Ashraf paid a courtesy visit to General Waker-uz-Zaman at the Army Headquarters. This marked the first visit made by a Pakistan Navy chief to Bangladesh since the Liberation War in 1971. General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, visiting chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, paid a courtesy call on Yunus at the State Guest House, Jamuna, in October 2025. Additionally, Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan expressed interest in importing ships from Bangladesh after visiting shipyards in Chattogram.
Furthering bilateral engagements, the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Pakistan Halal Authority (PHA) to boost the trade of halal products between the two countries. The MoU, signed on 27 October 2025 on the sidelines of the 9th Meeting of the Bangladesh–Pakistan Joint Economic Commission (JEC) held in Dhaka, aims to enhance collaboration in standards, certification, and trade facilitation for halal products, paving the way for smoother halal meat imports and exports between the two nations. At the same time, the Bangladesh government signed a MoU with Pakistan for importing Atap rice.
These blossoming relations continue to spill over to the cultural front as well. Pakistani singer Rahat Fateh Ali Khan has announced his highly anticipated concert, scheduled for December 21 in Dhaka. The event, organised by the Spirits of July platform, will take place at the Bangladesh Army Stadium and marks a cultural milestone, as organisers increasingly spotlight Pakistani artists over Indian performers in the post-Hasina era. Pakistani artists such as Atif Aslam are gaining immense popularity in Bangladesh. Ali Azmat, the lead vocalist of the renowned Pakistani band ‘Junoon’, is also set to perform in Dhaka for his first solo concert in February 2025. Additionally, the death anniversary of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding Father of Pakistan, was observed at the National Press Club in Dhaka in mid-September 2024, marking the first time since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.
Pakistan has expressed interest in establishing a university branch campus in Bangladesh and enhancing cooperation in the education sector. The country has also offered 500 new scholarships for Bangladeshi students. The Bangladesh-Pakistan Joint Economic Commission (JEC) discussed the issue at its ninth meeting in the capital on October 27. Dhaka University has also opened its doors to Pakistani students. According to the revised policy, Pakistani students will be eligible to seek admission to Dhaka University, and Bangladeshi students will also be able to pursue courses in Pakistan.
It is noteworthy that during his four-day visit to China in mid-March 2025, Yunus stated that Bangladesh could be China’s gateway to Northeast India. The seven states in the north-eastern part of India are called the Seven Sisters. Highlighting that these seven states are a landlocked region, Yunus remarked that Bangladesh is currently “the only guardian of the ocean”, effectively noting India’s strategic disadvantage. More recently, Brigadier General (Retd.) Abdullahil Aman Azmi commented that as long as India remains intact, they will not allow Bangladesh to live in peace until the Day of Judgment. Here, the focus was again on India’s Northeast region, which is considered a critical spot in India’s territorial integrity.
Notably, while Pakistan’s main parties are centrist, elements within its government have consistently bypassed Bangladeshi centrists to maintain ties with hardline Islamists. This alignment heightens cross-border security risks, threatening the stability of India’s Northeast and its broader strategic interests.
The leading Pakistani English daily DAWN reported at least four Bangladeshis confirmed killed while fighting for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), referred to as the Fitna al-Khawarij by the Pakistani state. Bangladesh’s Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit adds that another two dozen or so Bangladeshi nationals are currently in Pakistan, fighting for the TTP and other militant organisations — a trend that experts say first emerged in 2023 and has alarmed authorities in Dhaka. Additionally, in November, a former sports advisor, Asif Mahmud, announced that, under the youth self-defense basic training project, 8,850 people will be trained at the Bangladesh Krira Shikkha Protishtan (BKSP) in Savar and at seven centres across the country. The project cost is estimated at a staggering 27 crore taka, raising further alarms in Delhi.
The developments in Bangladesh present no easy choices for India. Regional powers are often called upon to navigate competing considerations: between legal obligations and humanitarian concerns, between accommodating new interlocutors and maintaining consistency with previous partners, and between short-term bilateral adjustments and long-term regional architecture. Therefore, for India, the rapidly deteriorating relationship with Bangladesh poses a threefold challenge: growing insecurity and infiltration along the 4,000-kilometer border; the rising threat of anti-India forces establishing cross-border bases; and the exploitation of the rift between Dhaka and New Delhi by Islamabad.
On the other hand, deepening military ties with Türkiye signals that Dhaka is diversifying its defence partners and breaking the old regional monopoly. Türkiye’s growing presence in Bangladesh, the Pakistani army’s invitation to train Bangladeshi military personnel at the end of last year, and Pakistan’s return to Bangladesh’s defense sphere in February 2025 were seen as signs of the delicate three-way relationship that Türkiye has established with Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ankara’s embrace of Islamabad has provided a diplomatic bridge that has facilitated the rapprochement between Islamabad and Dhaka. This reflects a strategic and geopolitical realignment in South Asia. A Pakistan–Bangladesh rapprochement involving China and Türkiye is causing Delhi to worry that India could potentially be excluded from its own region.
Moreover, the supplier is Türkiye, a powerful NATO country that is expanding its strategic presence right next to India’s troubled eastern flank, rather than China, with which Delhi has experience. The prospect of renewed hostility and instability on India’s eastern borders, facilitated by the Pakistan-Bangladesh military rapprochement, is also a cause for concern. China’s continued infrastructure and financial presence in Bangladesh, alongside Pakistan, is another issue that challenges Delhi.
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