As 2026 unfolded, U.S. foreign policy dominated the headlines, with two developments standing out. First, the removal of Nicolás Maduro as president of Venezuela on drug trafficking charges and the subsequent U.S. attempt to gain full control over the country’s oil reserves; and second, the growing U.S. interest in Greenland, a territory ultimately governed by Denmark. We are clearly entering a period—at least in the short to medium term—where international norms and conventions are being aggressively challenged and, in some cases, overturned. Of course, we are only at the beginning of this potentially new epoch, and there is no certainty regarding the duration or depth of the changes that may occur. Nevertheless, many politicians and commentators are speculating about which other countries might be in President Trump’s line of sight. It is within this context that I consider the position of European non-sovereign territories in the Western Hemisphere and whether the U.S. might have any interest in them.
U.S. involvement in the hemisphere is long established, and small (largely island) states and territories have not been shielded from U.S. action—perhaps most clearly with its invasion of Grenada in 1983 after the collapse of the revolutionary government. But in smaller ways, too, the U.S. has had an interest—for instance, the Naval Air Station Bermuda, a U.S. Navy establishment from 1940 to 1995 in Bermuda (a British Overseas Territory). Small islands have often been buffeted and compromised by U.S. national interests. Indeed, in 1917, the U.S. purchased the Danish West Indies (now U.S. Virgin Islands) from Denmark.
While recent U.S. interest in Greenland highlights ambitions beyond the continental sphere, similar logic could well apply to European territories in the Western Hemisphere. If you include the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, there are 19 European overseas territories in the hemisphere: several are integral parts of the metropolitan power, such as Martinique (France) and Bonaire (Netherlands), while others are associated with, but ultimately ruled by, the metropole—for example, Aruba (Netherlands) and the British Virgin Islands (Britain).
What interest might the U.S. have in these British, Dutch, and French territories? French Guiana, on the northern coast of South America, just east of Venezuela, is particularly significant due to its size and resources, including potentially large reserves of oil. At the moment, hopes for offshore oil production clash with the current ban on exploration under French climate law. Advocates argue drilling could bring jobs and greater autonomy to the territory, while critics warn of ecological risks and serious spill potential. The present French government is holding firm that oil exploration should not take place, but with a potential change in government in Paris next year and possible U.S. interest the approach could swing 180 degrees.
French Guiana also has vast tropical hardwood forests. They cover 8 million hectares and host exceptional biological diversity. About a third of the forest is currently being managed, producing 80,000 m3 of logs per year. But illegal logging is a growing problem, largely driven by illegal gold mining. So, the efforts to ensure sustainable development are already difficult, and as with oil exploration the approach to logging and gold mining could change quickly.
Further, the territory is home to Europe’s Spaceport, a major European facility used for launching satellites and rockets. Its equatorial location significantly improves launch efficiency. So again, it would not be beyond the bounds of possibility that the U.S. might take an interest in French Guiana for this reason too. French Guiana’s status as an integral part of France might complicate U.S. ambitions, but Washington’s recent assertiveness suggests that greater commercial influence could still be pursued, especially with a more sympathetic government in Paris.
The smaller French, British, and Dutch territories—including Guadeloupe, Aruba, and BVI—lack major natural resources but hold strategic value. These territories occupy critical maritime routes near the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico (America)—areas vital for global trade and U.S. naval operations. Control or influence over these islands would strengthen America’s ability to monitor shipping lanes and respond to regional crises. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao (ABC) are located just off Venezuela’s coast, offering valuable proximity, although it should be noted that Aruba and Curaçao are already ‘active cooperative security locations’, which allow U.S. and partner nation aircraft the use of airfields to support the region’s efforts to combat transnational organised crime. The U.S. Air Force handles day-to-day operations.
In addition, Curaçao is attempting to reopen its Isla oil refinery. The refinery, built by Royal Dutch Shell in 1918, became central to Venezuela’s oil industry, refining Venezuelan crude due to Venezuela’s lack of refinery capacity and challenging harbours. It closed in 2019 after PDVSA’s operating lease ended, following years of decline. However, the government of Curaçao is keen to re-open the refinery, hoping that it will boost employment and tax receipts. The suggestion that the U.S. runs Venezuela’s oil industry for the time being might give the plans for the refinery a boost; albeit with the risk that direct U.S. involvement in Curaçao could increase.
Other concerns for the ABC islands are the impact on their tourism industries if Venezuela continues to be a military hotspot and the possibility of further Venezuelan refugees arriving; though the latter issue is a long-standing one: it is estimated that 31,000 Venezuelan refugees presently live in Aruba and Curaçao. These islands are also key nodes in drug transshipment routes, prompting strong cooperation among U.S., French, Dutch and British law enforcement agencies—though Washington might argue that more aggressive measures are needed, potentially expanding its involvement. The arrest and later conviction of BVI Premier Andrew Fahie in a U.S. court on cocaine trafficking and money laundering charges in 2024 underscores that such interventions are not unprecedented.
Finally, there are the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. There are perhaps three issues here that are particularly worthy of consideration. First, there is oil in the Falklands’ territorial waters and indeed on 10 December, after 15 years of delays, partners Navitas Petroleum and Rockhopper Exploration took the final investment decision on the Sea Lion oil project. The phased, US$2 billion development unlocks ~315 million barrels of recoverable oil, targeting peak production of 50,000 bpd and first oil in 2028. Second, the Falklands sees itself as ‘a gateway to Antarctica’ , being in a key strategic position for the renewal of the Antarctic Treaty in 2048. Both issues could attract greater U.S. engagement in the Falklands, and by association, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Finally, there is the contested status of the two territories, with Argentina laying claim. Could a strong U.S.—Argentina alliance put at risk British sovereignty?
The recent assertiveness of U.S. foreign policy signals a willingness to challenge established norms and expand influence in strategic regions. While Venezuela and Greenland dominate current headlines, the logic underpinning these moves—resource acquisition, security interests, and geopolitical positioning—could easily extend to European territories in the Western Hemisphere. From resource-rich French Guiana to strategically located island chains near vital maritime routes, these territories present opportunities that align with U.S. priorities. Whether through economic engagement, security cooperation, or more direct involvement, Washington’s actions in the coming years may reshape the political and economic landscape of the hemisphere. For European powers, this raises critical questions about sovereignty, sustainability, and the durability of long-standing alliances in an era of renewed geopolitical competition.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
