Five years ago, I published an article titled “The State of China’s Soft Power in 2020”. In its opening, I noted that China’s ability to attract was a subject of both frequent discussion and misunderstanding. Since then, despite ongoing challenges in geopolitics and the economy, China has become an even more prominent global presence. This raises an important question: is Chinese soft power still elusive, or is it finally taking shape? This matter is especially relevant given the growing debate about the decline of American soft power after a shift toward coercive hard and economic power – such as ‘peace through strength’ and unilateral tariffs – which reflects a broader weaponization of the world economy. This piece will adhere to the structure of my previous article, utilizing the late Joseph Nye’s triad of soft power resources – culture, political values, and foreign policies – while further developing them through a broader analysis of attractive national features supported by authoritative opinions and relevant data. Back then, quoting my concise overview, “China’s culture still ha[d] limited appeal, its values mostly fail[ed] to reflect the country’s image and reputation abroad, and its foreign policy [was] seen with skepticism at best – and as hegemonic at worst.” What has changed in these five turbulent years in which we experienced a global pandemic, the eruption of two major and still lingering conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine, and a global tariffs shakeup?
In 2017, Foreign Policy asked, “Why is China so uncool?” The answer lied in a core tenet of soft power: attraction mainly arises from a country’s civil society, not its government. Yet, across 2025, I came across pieces asking questions such as: “Is China the new Cool?”, hinting at marked perceptual changes within less than a decade. The Economist – to my surprise – went even further, when publishing a piece titled “How China became cool”, not if. Several outlets, including Foreign Policy itself and the Asia Society, further examined this topic, noting achievements like the global success of the ‘toy monster’ Labubu, the animated film Ne Zha 2, and the video game Black Myth: Wukong. The South China Morning Post also explored whether these successes reflect a possible relaxation of government control over cultural production.
Cultural promotion rarely faces resistance unless it appears propagandistic or imperialist. However, promoting political values is more controversial, and China’s progress in this area remains uneven. While China seldom highlights its communist roots abroad, authoritarianism has gained appeal, and Beijing’s promotional efforts have seen some success. Additionally, while domestic economic growth is decelerating, leaders in developing countries still remember how the nation’s appealing economic model – which “promotes values associated with a strong state and social stability” – helped lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, and it continues to do so. Whether China is exporting its model remains debated, but Beijing is actively promoting change through its Global Initiatives, which, though intentionally broad, cover key areas including civilization, security, and AI governance. Combined with its ‘reluctant’ climate leadership role, China is at the center of major socioeconomic and political shifts that bring new responsibilities and expectations. These developments are closely linked to foreign policy, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI reflects Beijing’s aspirations as the leader of the developing world, which has generally welcomed new infrastructure, technologies, traineeships, and cultural exchanges through its Confucius Institutes. In 2020, I stated that the BRI “appear[ed] to be the country’s best shot to prove its detractors wrong.” Although efforts have been made to debunk debt-trap diplomacy claims, criticism remains. However, major projects naturally face challenges and delays, especially at a global scale, and no viable alternatives have emerged from critics. For now, the soft-economic appeal of the ‘new silk road’ endures, despite mixed results. Furthermore, not to be dismissed, China has been granting visa-free access to a growing number of countries for several years now; a move that has been widely appreciated and resulted in record visits. Perceptions of openness – accurate or not – boost reputation.
Beyond my observations – and before giving my updated take – what do some of the sharpest observers of China’s soft power dynamics argue? Irene S. Wu, a long-time researcher of the intersection between communications technology and politics, who more recently devised a quantitative rubric to measure soft power in international relations, observed that since China “opened itself to the world, its soft power ranking was always in the top 20 countries.” However, although tourists and students are increasingly welcome, there is still resistance towards long-term migrants. Joshua Kurlantzick, who wrote the pioneering Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World in 2007, and inspired my investigations into soft-economic power interactions, followed up with Beijing’s Global Media Offensive in late 2022. Although the scope sounds narrower (or broader, depending on perspectives), the core message is clear: the view that “China’s ability to project ‘soft power’ through its media industries and its global influence campaigns [is] quite limited, and [that] its ability to wield influence within the domestic politics of other countries [is] nonexistent” no longer holds true. This connects to a well-known quote from Nye: “In a global Information Age, victory also depends upon whose story wins.” Since 2013, Xi Jinping has recognized this point and encouraged the Chinese people to tell China’s story well.
How is this endeavor going so far?
Maria Repnikova, one of the foremost experts on Chinese soft power, contends that “China does not offer a clear vision of its role in the global order.” For the time being, she notes, China’s ideology centers on “resentment toward the West,” without offering a clear global vision or policy model. Many abroad remain wary of China, particularly as a leader. Still, Beijing’s cautious stance may be intentional, letting it avoid overcommitment and scrutiny while gaining from the U.S. retreat. The Global Soft Power Index ranks nation brands and highlights China’s progress since 2020, moving from eighth to second place by 2025. China scores high in ‘Familiarity,’ with improving ‘Reputation’ post-pandemic and fluctuating ‘Influence.’ Its weakest areas are ‘Media & Communication’ and ‘People & Values,’ while ‘Business & Trade’ and ‘Education & Science’ lead. The U.S. remains first, but China is steadily closing the gap.
Thus, what are the main takeaways from the past five years?
The blend of soft-economic power, whether intentional or not, is yielding positive outcomes throughout much of the developing world, where pragmatism takes precedence over patronizing or moralistic ideological approaches. These results stem from tangible accomplishments and genuine acknowledgement, although none are guaranteed or permanent. Building a positive reputation is challenging, and it can be quickly lost if trust and legitimacy wane. These improvements are evident both in sociocultural terms – such as increased appreciation for Chinese products and brands – and through the perceived benefits of the BRI as well as broader economic exchanges.
In line with this, I stand by my claim that “China seems to adapt its strategies to each country, and its soft power ‘sharpens’ upon necessity.” This largely reflects the double-edged nature of interdependence, which can be weaponized into coercion or used to co-opt towards win-win cooperation. These dynamics are ever evolving, and it would be premature to provide a univocal verdict on such a complex scenario. Nevertheless, perceptions matter, and Trump’s America First policy may be serving China’s interests as the former is no longer recognized as a model of stability and reliability. More generally, these significant developments may indicate the emergence of a post-liberal understanding of soft power, although its defining characteristics remain ambiguous and appear to be more a response to disruption than a unified or compelling blueprint for a new global order.
To conclude, China has amassed more resources than ever across the board – both hard and soft – but greater challenges and uncertainties are also mounting up. That said, China’s gains are hard to deny, but five years are not enough to define a new paradigm of attraction in international relations. As mentioned in 2020, Beijing remains eager “to test the boundaries between attraction and inducement,” with even more confidence, but I also still believe that “the country’s intents are firstly economic and only secondly ideological and political,” especially considering domestic interests to be prioritized. The degree to which China can assume a position of global leadership remains uncertain at this time. However, Beijing might not need to fill the vacuum on its own, while opting instead to share the burden with other engaged stakeholders, particularly from the East and the South, who would likely welcome opportunities for genuine shared prosperity.
Is this wishful thinking or pragmatic idealism? We might need to wait a few more years to answer this.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
