The African Union (AU) has been lauded for its gains in security on the African continent. Being the first regional intergovernmental organisation to undertake peace operations, its experience in this regard has contributed to redefining approaches in this exercise. However, a closer examination of its exploits reveals that the AU is more committed to preserving the liberal international order through peacekeeping that has at its core the promotion of democracy, thereby leaving little room for local approaches to conflict resolution in its dealings. This posture of the AU sometimes hinders its ability to resolve conflicts and finds the organisation working against African interests. Since its formation in 2002, the AU has taken up roles in addressing conflicts on the continent. It has enabled better synergy between Africa’s major Regional Economic Communities (RECs) through the effective utilisation of the Subsidiarity Principle, and its successes in conflict resolution through mediation and peace operations in Burundi, the Comoros, and Darfur led to the mantra ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. However, a closer inspection of the exploits of the AU gives little room for confidence in its ability to sincerely deliver peace. This is largely due to its funding handicap where the AU is dependent on external funding that gives its external benefactors the leverage to decide where and how conflict on the continent is addressed. Of course, the AU has voiced its displeasure over the overarching influence of external actors in its affairs. But this seldom accounts for much as observed in Muammar Gaddafi’s removal in 2011 where the AU, on African soil, was sidelined by NATO. Events in Somalia where the US and Ethiopia pulled the AU into the conflict, is another clear case in point. After three operational name changes and eighteen years of peace enforcement, peace remains elusive in Somalia.
Thus far, the lapses of the AU are not restricted to external influence. Internal dynamics have also hampered the effectiveness of the AU on security issues. The existence of the African Standby Force (ASF), a continental force under the AU and its RECs, seems to have been forgotten. Amid the crises across the continent, especially the onslaught of Islamic jihadists in the central Sahel region since 2016, this outfit has never been activated. This is ironic considering that after over $1 billion spent and fourteen years of planning from 2002, the ASF was acclaimed to be fully operational in 2016, but without the capability to rapidly deploy, which was the major reason for its conception. A 2014 publication states that: the US lavished money on what was described as the African Peace and Security Architecture, providing $500 million to train up to 50,000 African troops. British involvement was also substantial, with more than £110 million a year being invested via the African Conflict Prevention Pool for nearly a decade. As at December 2013, the figure stood at £51.5 million.
Arguably, the premature operationalisation of the ASF was to propitiate the US, the EU, and other donors in view of the investments made. Nine years since it was deemed operational, the ASF has been deployed, but not in line with the mandating processes, deployment timelines, and mission scenarios for which it was designed. The ASF’s capabilities were used to plan and deploy an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission to The Gambia. The same was done with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which deployed a mission to Lesotho. In line with the ASF framework, SADC has also deployed missions to Mozambique in 2021 and to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2024. Similarly, the East African Community (EAC) deployed a regional stabilisation force in eastern DRC in 2022. Through these deployments, the Peace and Security Council, as well as African member states, have never used the ASF as originally planned. These deployments have followed the ad hoc processes used by the AU before the ASF was conceived, and thus questions the relevance and viability of the ASF given that deployments are dependent on a coalition of willing Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Thus, the AU’s ability to keep the peace now is no better than its capacity before 2016 when the ASF was deemed to have reached full operational capability. It is disappointing that despite the Islamic Jihad in the Sahel, which was responsible for 51% of terrorism related deaths globally in 2024, the ASF has been unable to deploy even at the end of 2025.
Recent events in the West point to tougher times ahead for the AU. This has been evident in Somalia where the AU’s 13,000 peace enforcement troops go for months without funding. With reduced US spending in Africa under President Donald Trump’s second term in office and a similar approach toward Europe that has prompted reduced EU spending on Africa, the AU is experiencing tougher times in funding its security programmes. This is inevitable when $301 million (77.5%) of the AU’s $388 million budget is financed by international partners. The Kaberuka proposal on internal revenue generation will unlikely work as the AU lacks the capacity to monitor the 0.2% tariffs placed on imports by member states and lacks the will to compel them to remit the agreed percentage to its coffers. However, this celebrated idea of Donald Kaberuka has worked for ECOWAS in raising funds for its activities since it has a small number of member states, interests are less divergent, and there is greater leverage for reprimand. Extrapolating this fund raising policy to the larger AU body was bound to have limited success, especially as the organisation lacks the capacity to effectively reprimand an erring state.
As long as the AU remains deficient in funding its activities and has to rely on the West, and now China, to get things done, it will be obligated to further the interests of its benefactors while striving to protect Africans. And when the test of its loyalty comes down to the wire, attending to its benefactors takes precedence. What the AU could try is to have all mobile service providers on the continent pay a small tax of 0.2% or less for every airtime/data recharge done on the continent, the monies of which would be channelled directly to the AU account meant to fund its operations. It is easier to get mobile service providers to organise this and hold them to account, than to get member states to adhere to levies such as the Kaberuka policy. On the continent, there are over 416 million mobile subscribers who contribute over $220 billion to the African economy, of which $440 million (0.2%) goes to running the AU. With this, the AU can run its affairs with greater independence and with loyalty to the people who fund it.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
