The end of the Cold War was followed by a range of inter-state and civil wars, fuelling instability worldwide. The shocking events of the Rwandan genocide, alongside growing security uncertainties in an increasingly globalized world, pushed European Union (EU) countries to discuss the EU’s new role as a global security actor (Olsen, 2009; Alexandru, 2017). This role of the EU is now consolidated within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which has a unique, ‘comprehensive approach,’ combining civilian and military capabilities, to carry out crisis management, crisis prevention and peacekeeping operations as a means to contribute to international security (Popuu, 2020; EEAS, 2022). Since then, scholarly debates have revolved around the ability of the EU to contribute to international security (Hoijtink and Muehlenhoff, 2019). This essay will not generalise but rather analyse two case studies, namely EUCAP Nestor (a civilian mission) and EUFOR Chad/CAR (a military operation), to illustratethe contributions to international security, or lack thereof, in the timeframe between 2008 and 2014—a period where human security was gaining momentum as a possible strategic direction for the EU (Solana, 2014).
To this end, an analysis combining a civilian and military mission is useful, since both form part of the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to security and will provide a more nuanced understanding of its contributions. Human security principles will be used to measure the contributions, and the theme of ‘interests’ will serve as an additional analytical layer to understand their failed implementation. This paper argues that even though discursively CSDP missions and operations appear to make meaningful contributions to international security, the EU fails in implementing some human security principles due to the driving force of EU and member states’ interests, limiting the contributions to human security and in turn, international security. Section 1 will delve into the conceptual framework which introduces 1) conceptualizations of human security and the EU human security discourse; 2) the human security principles; and 3) the key theme of the paper. Section 2 and Section 3 will analyse the case studies separately, which will then be brought together into a discussion in the conclusion.
Conceptual Framework: A Human Security- and Interests-Based Approach
Famously introduced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the term ‘human security’ shifted the paradigm from the traditional referent object of the state to human beings and communities (UNDP, 1994). The 2004 Barcelona Report which introduced a ‘Human Security Doctrine’ and was presented to the EU High Representative for CSDP—then Javier Solana, a key advocate of human security (Christou, 2014)—defined it as ‘freedom from fear’, where the EU shall be concerned with protecting all human beings, inside or outside the Union, from gross human rights violations (Albrecht et al., 2004:5-8). This understanding of human security lies between the Canadian ‘narrow’ understanding, that is the protection from violence, and the UNDP’s ‘broad’ understanding, which includes tackling insecurities stemming from the cultural, economic or environmental spheres, among others (Kaldor and Martin, 2009:3). When it comes to connecting human security to international security, Glasius and Kaldor (2005) and the Barcelona Report (2004) argued that contemporary European security is interdependent and interrelated to the security of people outside the Union. Therefore, when the EU contributes to human security abroad, it is also contributing to human security in the EU and globally.
The human security rhetoric in the EU has been largely implicit, mostly seen in policy goals and the methodologies employed to realize them (Solana, 2014). The EU has contributed to international security previously by ‘reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity’ (Council of the European Union in Martin and Kaldor, 2009:1). Buzzwords such as ‘human rights’, ‘good governance’ and ‘development’ are just but a few of concepts present in EU discourse that guide and shape European foreign policy and reflect a human security approach to dealing with issues of international security. The EU’s human security approach was also explicitly mentioned for the first time in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) to describe the departure from ‘classic security interventions’ to address people’s needs in contexts of serious insecurity (Solana, 2014:253-54; Martin and Kaldor, 2009). The combination of military and civilian instruments in crisis management for ‘comprehensive’ planning, also point towards a human security approach, emphasizing the need for both types of capabilities to achieve political stability and development to promote peace (Hynek, 2011; Kaldor, 2012). Notwithstanding, although human security is present discursively, it has not yet been developed to the point of a ‘driving strategic concept’ for CSDP operations (Christou, 2014:364). Therefore, this paper will work with the following assumptions: 1) to contribute to international security a human security approach is essential; and 2) although not made explicit in the EU’s security strategy, the EU implicitly uses human security as a guiding concept discursively, thus why it is relevant to assess its contributions from this standpoint.
The paper will use five principles identified in the Madrid Report which map out the elements needed for a CSDP intervention to contribute to human security, including: 1) the primacy of human rights; 2) legitimate political authority; 3) a bottom-up approach; 4) effective multilateralism; and 5) regional focus (Albrecht et al., 2007). Firstly, the principle of primacy of human rights places at the heart of the operation respect and protection for human rights of the host populations, where the focus is on protecting civilians, rather than winning a war. The principle of legitimate political authority entails putting in place legitimate political authority in the host country which will then continue to be the provider of human security after the EU’s withdrawal. Although the EU intervention must command and control the mission, they must also be seen as legitimate by the host society and the international community. The principle of bottom-up approach entails collaborating and communicating during all stages of planning and implementation with key local stakeholders (Albrecht et al., 2004:14-18; Albrecht et al., 2007:4). This corresponds to the principle of local ownership which in EU discourse seeks to create constructive dialogue between EU personnel and local populations for ‘commonly agreed objectives,’ and has been explicitly articulated as a core principle in CSDP missions and operations (Ejdus, 2017:466). Subsequently, the principle of effective multilateralism comprises working effectively in collaboration or coordination with other international or regional bodies and includes respecting relevant institutional procedures. Lastly, parting from the assumption that many wars have ‘no clear boundaries’, and that situations of insecurity can have spillover effects through the movement of refugees, internally displaced persons and criminal groups, it is important that the EU implements missions regionally, and that it does so taking into consideration the relevance of sub-state dimensions, such as organized crime. The Madrid Report also highlights the principle of ‘clear transparent civilian command’; however, this essay will not discuss it, due to word limit considerations (Albrecht et al., 2004:18-20; Albrecht et al., 2007:4-5).
These principles provide a robust structure to understand the end goals of human security (Martin and Kaldor, 2009) making them a useful tool to assess EU contributions to international security. In addition to these principles, the paper adds a thematic layer of ‘interests.’ This theme is relevant for the discussion because the literature has expressed concerns with the political dimension of the CSDP, particularly how interests of the EU or individual member states are often reflected in the missions (Pohl, 2014; Olsen, 2009; Dijkstra, 2010; Juncos, 2018). Given the colonial baggage of some member states in Africa (Menon, 2009) this is a worthwhile concern, as it is also interrelated to the enforcement of the principles, or lack thereof. The principles will serve as a foundation to assess the contributions of the CSDP missions and operations to international security; however, an additional layer will be added to the analysis, that is, the tension between EU, French and African interests. The human security approach suggests that the EU should go beyond the protection of its borders and protect people on the ground from severe insecurities (Albrecht et al., 2004). To reach this aim, the EU should abide by the human security principles, but also be weary of the interests it promotes—although European interests will always be embedded in interventions (Juncos, 2018), these should be appropriately balanced with the interests of host populations.
The Case of EUCAP Nestor
The European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) was a civilian CSDP mission launched in 2012 and was initially mandated to last 2 years and create a ‘self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of (…) maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance’ (EU in Ejdus, 2017:470). It was designed to complement the military missions of EUNAVFOR Atlanta (2008) and the EUTM Somalia (2010) (Arconada-Ledesma, 2021). In 2016, it was renewed and renamed EUCAP Somalia and is still ongoing at the time of writing (EEAS, 2022). This mission was chosen because the Horn of Africa comprises a priority region for the EU given its geo-strategic importance, the historical ties, and the willingness to tackle insecurities in the region and threats that could have spillover effects onto the European continent (Rodt et al., 2019; Council of the European Union, 2011). It also illustrates some of the main structural challenges of the CSDP in promoting a bottom-up approach more generally (Ejdus, 2017). This section argues that the contributions of EUCAP Nestor to international security were limited due to the failed implementation of the bottom-up approach, legitimate political authority and primacy of human rights, which compromised the effectiveness of the mission and reflected the interests-based motivations for EU interventionism in Africa.
At first sight, the mission succeeded in implementing the principles of primacy of human rights, regional focus and multilateralism. The primacy of human rights is implicitly seen in the mission, by the EU’s focus on enhancing coastal security, policing in the region (Rodt et al., 2019), and strengthening the ‘maritime criminal justice system’ to prosecute individuals suspected of piracy, human trafficking, among other crimes (EEAS, 2014:1). Its coordination with EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atlanta, also shows the willingness of the EU to take strong action to improve the situation in the region. This is a human security focus because the underlying objective is not to fight a war, but rather to increase the security of persons in the region through combatting piracy and related illegal activities. Regarding the regional focus, the mission was the first of its kind to explicitly acknowledge the complex political context of the region, working in Djibouti, Seychelles, Tanzania and Somalia (EEAS, 2014:2). Even though this was an innovative step forward in crisis management reflecting the EU’s adaptability, the effectiveness of a regional focus was limited because the activities of the Union were not able to focus on Somalia, where the piracy issues originated (Rodt et al., 2019). In terms of multilateralism, the mission worked with international and regional bodies, including the United Nations, African Union and Oceans Beyond Piracy, which increased capabilities to tackle local insecurities. It also collaborated with international and local experts to deliver its training on maritime security, sometimes delivering training alongside experts and coast guard personnel native to the region (Rodt et al., 2019).
However, even though the EU sought to implement a bottom-up approach by empowering local communities to be part of the solution, this mission was critiqued for its top-down nature, which compromised its effectiveness and damaged the trust of local actors (Rodt et al., 2019; Ejdus, 2017). There is evidence of EUCAP Nestor encouraging local actors to collaborate on projects with one another, such as the development of websites. However, the mission failed in consulting the needs of the key government actors and local stakeholders for the first 5 years of operations (Rodt et al., 2019), excluding key local input in the preparatory phase, which was also evident in the fact-finding sheets (Ejdus, 2017). This compromised the mission’s effectiveness because the EU’s planning did not match local realities in the implementation stage and there was a lack of awareness on the ‘real’ situation of piracy on the ground (Ejdus, 2017; Rodt et al., 2019). Additionally, the principle of legitimate political authority was absent from the mission, as the mandate did not include solving the political situation on the ground and placing a legitimate authority to sustain the efforts of the mission after withdrawal (EEAS, 2014).
According to Olsen (2009), much of EU interventionism in Africa is done to further EU interests, something that Ejdus (2017) has also echoed in the case of EUCAP Nestor, arguing that the failure to implement a bottom-up approach was due to the politics behind the CSDP. Indeed, an EU diplomat admitted that they intervened in the Horn of Africa for their own peace and security interests, rather than to contribute to the security and safety of persons in the region (in Ejdus, 2017). The EU interests as the driving force during EUCAP Nestor can be reflected through the preparatory phase and the mandate of the mission. The preparatory phase is a key stage in a mission, as it provides critical information about local capacities and the socio-political context which will affect implementation. When the EU did not include local stakeholders in its preparatory phase, it sent a message that the mission was defined according to its own interests and resources (Ejdus, 2017). This had detrimental impacts on the mission and limited its contributions to human security on the ground because the EU did not consider the needs of the people and the resources needed to create a meaningful and lasting impact on the security of persons in the Horn of Africa.
The EU’s interests are also evident in the mandate, which limited the mission to tackling issues of maritime security and piracy. The EU has officially put forth in its past Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, that issues addressed through CSDP missions and operations must not only enhance the security of host states, but also strengthen the security of its own citizens, which includes controlling migration flows, and preventing terrorism, drug trafficking, and piracy (Juncos, 2018; Olsen, 2009). Tackling exclusively the latter can bring contestations in terms of the legitimacy of the mission and local buy-in (Juncos, 2018). In this case, the mission had low support from much of the local population because in Somalia piracy was seen as an issue secondary to the more problematic humanitarian crisis, political and economic situation and general security of the region, and was even regarded by some as beneficial, since it contributed to some coastal towns’ development (Arconada-Ledesma, 2021). It also puts into question whether the primacy of human rights was met, as the mission arguably seemed more concerned with the spillover effects of piracy on Europe than the immediate humanitarian needs of the population. In this sense, the EU tailored the mission to its own interests, ignoring other more serious human rights issues suffered by the population (Arconada-Ledesma, 2021). Therefore, EUCAP Nestor exemplified a case where the CSDP contributions to international security are limited due to the driving EU interests. This hindered the effectiveness of the mission by failing to implement a bottom-up approach in the preparatory phase, and damaging its legitimacy and concern for human rights by crafting a mandate that did not reflect the most urgent security needs of the populations.
The Case of EUFOR Chad/CAR
The mission of EUFOR Chad/CAR was a military operation launched in 2008. The EU deployed over 3000 troops to the northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) and eastern Chad which was to be operational for one year (Pohl, 2014). The three main goals of the operation were: 1) ‘to contribute to protecting civilians in danger’; 2) ‘to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid’ and 3) ‘to contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment’ (Council of the EU in Pohl, 2014:196). This was a ‘bridging operation’ where the EU was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the UN’s wider MINURCAT mission that would accept responsibility upon the withdrawal of EU troops (Dijkstra, 2010). This mission was chosen since it is exemplary of a time where the EU sought to use military capabilities for human security end goals (Solana, 2014). It also comprised the ‘most ambitious military operation’ that had ever been launched at the time (IISS in Pohl, 2014:195). This section will argue that while Chad showed a strong commitment to human rights, multilateralism and a regional focus, the operation failed in fulfilling the principle of legitimate political authority. This case study also shows the problematic political nature of some CSDP operations and how the interests of France created obstacles to achieving human security. Note that this section has excluded the analysis of a bottom-up approach, as there is insufficient information in the literature to assess this.
Regarding the primacy of human rights, regional focus and multilateralism, the mission intended to contribute to human security. The primacy of human rights was clearly intended from the mission’s mandate, focusing on the protection and safety of civilians, which according to Oxfam and other NGOs was to some extent successful, through its patrolling, communication with local leaders and the defending of civilians during government-rebel fighting (Dijkstra, 2010). The mission also had a regional focus to tackle the then ongoing crisis in Darfur (Pohl, 2014), which had long frustrated the EU countries and presented a good opportunity to contribute to peace and security in the region (Olsen, 2009). As a ‘bridging operation’ it implemented the principle of multilateralism by working closely with the UN, in preparing the ground for its MINURCAT operation. Even though passing responsibility to the UN was problematic, this was mostly due to UN unpreparedness and was therefore, more at fault than the EU, who did all it could to protect the region with the capacities it had (Dijkstra, 2010).
However, when it came to the principle of legitimate political authority, the mission was questionable. Alluding to this principle, the UN Secretary General at the time noted how limited impacts resulting from both the UN and EU interventions was due to the mandate itself, which refrained from tackling the roots of the conflict in Chad, including its ‘political and legitimacy crisis’ (Pohl, 2014:196). The EU and UN both failed in this regard of human security because they did not intend in their mandate to establish authorities that would then go on to promote human security after their withdrawal, rendering the mission unsustainable (Pohl, 2014). Even though some claim the operation remained impartial despite France’s large involvement and the ambiguous nature of its role, there were concerns that France was acting in accordance with its own interests, in particular to satisfy national audiences at a critical time of elections, putting into question the legitimacy of the EU to intervene in the region (Pohl, 2014; Dijkstra, 2010). Indeed, France had a major in role in pushing the EU to launch a military CSDP mission in Chad/CAR, and its commitment was so strong, that when it was made clear that there would not be enough resources deployed to the mission, France would ‘plug the gaps’ when it came to helicopters and transport aircraft. It also contributed to the mission with approximately 2000 soldiers, out of which most came from the 3000 troops already present in Chad, which had been stationed there since the mid-1900s, with the role of stabilizing the country and supporting the pro-French government. This also raised concerns among French NGOs and rebels in Chad (Olsen, 2009:255).
Menon (2009:240) has raised concerns with France’s ‘dirty laundering’ in the EU, that is, the furthering of national interests through an ‘institutional cover’. The suspicions of French ‘instrumentalization’ (Menon, 2009:241) were widespread among countries in the EU and can be reflected on the lack of initial support for France in its diplomatic efforts to launch the mission, some citing its colonial baggage as a major concern (Pohl, 2014; Menon, 2009). Olsen (2009) has also contributed to this discussion by distinguishing between two sets of interests that drive military conflict management in Africa: 1) EU interests; 2) French interests. We considered how the EU can instrumentalize missions for their benefit in the previous section; however, this presents a case where member states, particularly France, can largely influence the CSDP (Olsen, 2009). This is problematic because this means that member states instrumentalize CSDP operations to satisfy their national interests, which may have implications for the mandate of the mission and the ability of the mission to contribute to human security. This impacts the mission’s effectiveness because national interests may take precedence over the security of African people. Olsen (2009:258) has noted that CSDP missions and operations are often developed for the ‘good of Europe and France’, rather than for the ‘good of Africa’, something that has also been echoed by Dijkstra (2010). Therefore, this case study has exemplified how the national interests of a particular Member State can interfere with doing what is ‘best’ for the African people, damaging the legitimacy of the mission vis-à-vis the local population, and limiting genuine and meaningful contributions to international security.
Conclusion
In conclusion, both cases show how the EU discursively sought to contribute to human security but failed to do so due to the driving force of EU or member states’s interests. The case of EUCAP Nestor failed in implementing a bottom-up approach, where the interests of the EU drove the mission to neglect the ‘real’ situation on the ground, hindering its effectiveness on the implementation stage, and in turn damaging its legitimacy and concern for human rights. The case of EUFOR Chad/CAR exemplified a case where the very legitimacy of the EU as an international actor was questioned due to France’s alleged instrumentalization of the EU to further national interests. Both missions show similar concerns with regards to contestations to their legitimacy, revealing the need for the Union to focus more on this core aspect of interventionism. They also show the interdependency between different levels of security, be it local, national, regional, or international (Rodt et al., 2019:48) from the EU perspective, where it has become key to fight insecurities abroad to maintain people within the Union safe. Therefore, the argument of the Barcelona Report (2004) still holds—and in this author’s viewpoint—should be developed from an implicit discourse to an explicit security strategy with tangible results.
Although the EU did not prove to be a knight in shining armor, it would be wrongful to deny the EU’s role as an international actor and its significance to contemporary international security—after all, a small contribution is still a contribution. As Menon (2009) argues, the EU’s ability to act, including how it can act, is constrained by its institutional structures and its constituent members. However, this analysis is constrained to the perspective of human security and merely shows one facet of its contributions to international security between 2008 and 2014. Therefore, these conclusions are not generalizable, but rather invite intellectual provocation for those interested in looking at EU interventions from this perspective. Other more comprehensive analyses would also consider the historical context of the host countries, the Union’s capabilities, and include an analysis on the implications of the interventions from a ‘normative power’ standpoint (Juncos, 2018; Kaldor, 2012).
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Further Reading on E-International Relations
